

Provincializing or Delinking: Is Decolonialism a More Radical Critique of European values?

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Abstract

In the last twenty years or so, decolonialism has claimed to be a more radical assessment of Eurocentrism than postcolonialism. Two distinct critical moves are at stake in this confrontation. Postcolonialism tries to rehabilitate non-European history in the development of the modern world, i.e. to conceive of Europe as a “province” among others (Dipesh Chakrabarty) and thereby to overcome a particularistic take on historiography and normativity. Only a complete account of modernity’s entanglements throughout the world would result in true universalism. Decolonialism on the other hand argues that modernity is inextricable from its “coloniality of power” (Anibal Quijano). This is the source of the argument for a “de-linking” (Walter Mignolo) from Western epistemology and normativity. This paper presents these two strategies and discusses their consequences for European values, distinguishing their cognitive and non-cognitive levels. The last section of this paper presents a discussion of two authors that both critical frameworks engage, C.L.R. James and Frantz Fanon, studying their respective strategies of breaking with Eurocentrism. These different critical strategies seem better conceived of through the postcolonial framework, rather than the decolonial.

Key words: Postcolonialism, Decolonialism, Provincializing Europe, Delinking, Modernity, Colonialism, Eurocentrism

For almost half a century, postcolonialism—and I focus here particularly on the variant that came out of Indian Subaltern Studies—has established itself as a powerful critique of Eurocentrism in historiography, political thought, and intellectual discourse. In the last twenty years or so, Latin-American decolonialism has claimed to be a more radical assessment of Eurocentrism than postcolonialism. In my paper I want to *first* present the different critical challenges to Eurocentrism each of these approaches offers and, *second*, carve out how postcolonial and decolonial approaches have claimed to overcome Eurocentrism. *Third*, I would like to discuss decolonialism’s claim to present a more radical critique of Eurocentrism than postcolonialism.

Values commonly attributed to Europe are important in two ways here. First, they are conceived of and dealt with in a different manner in both approaches. Considering the context of their emergence, they are critically relativized or pluralized in postcolonialism whereas decolonialism is tempted to see this context as contagious and therefore to reject them. Second, values often identified with the West have different modalities—they might be cognitive or non-cognitive to use Elizabeth Anderson’s distinction.¹ The latter designate moral and political value judgements, i.e. normative assessments of life-practical settings, for instance social structures (meant to be free, equal, democratic, etc.). The former encompass virtues of scientific proceedings, i.e. epistemic qualities: empirical adequacy, consistency, consonance with established theories, etc.²

My thesis is that postcolonialism offers a viable critique of Eurocentrism in “European values” whereas decolonialism’s critique throws the baby out with the bathwater. Normative and epistemological considerations might be linked to a certain history of power and subjugation but are not congruent with that social context. They need to be conscious of their origins and find ways of overcoming potential restrictions resulting from their historical genesis. Or to put it differently, social critique is well advised to provincialize “European values,” not to delink from them.

1) How to Conceive of and Challenge Eurocentrism

The Indian historian Dipesh Chakrabarty has opposed the false universalization of European metanarratives (nation-state, citizenship, etc.) in the description of non-European histories. In such a discourse, “the theoretical subject can only be a hyperreal ‘Europe’;”³ the discourse is “mimetic.”⁴ Chakrabarty however argues for the idea of “provincializing Europe.” Europe is certainly an important, but not the only historical actor in the rise of modernity. Europe rather constitutes one of the world’s provinces. This is why modernity’s history cannot be written solely through European references. The modern world is relationally constituted; interactions between different regions of the world need consideration. Eurocentrism appears where the entanglement of the European with the extra-European world is suppressed.

Global history is the historiographical approach which corresponds to the project of provincializing Europe. This is a historiography that challenges the diffusion model of the “hyperreal Europe,” according to which rationality, modernity, civilization, etc. have their source in Europe and were exported from there to all over the world. It is against that model that global history looks for analogies, parallels, connections, exchange, etc. Postcolonial approaches, the German historian Sebastian Conrad has contended, “take the entanglements of the modern world

as the point of departure for their transnational historiography;” they aim for writing “the relational constitution of the modern world.”⁵

The difference between postcolonial and decolonial approaches might be best illustrated by their respective understanding of the term “post.” *Postcolonialism* “certainly does *not* mean that we have passed from a regime of power-knowledge into some powerless and conflict-free time zone,” Jamaican-British cultural theorist Stuart Hall has argued. “Nevertheless, it does also stake its claim in terms of the fact that some other, related but as yet ‘emergent’ new configurations of power-knowledge relations are beginning to exert their distinctive and specific effects.”⁶ For *decolonialism*, however, “coloniality is still with us: there is no ‘post’ from decolonial perspectives.”⁷ The colonization of America in late fifteenth century constituted a “new model of power”⁸ that evolves around two axes: racial classification, and control and exploitation of labor and production. According to this analysis, Eurocentrism consists of “the radical absence of the ‘other’.”⁹ European colonial practice constitutes a “paradigm”¹⁰ that makes invisible both non-European subjects and the colonial order as totality. The very idea of Europe was established in relation to the rest of the colonized world.

Both approaches share the idea that Eurocentrism consists epistemologically in both the universalization of dominant, Western representations and the suppression of non-dominant, non-Western knowledge.¹¹ Decolonialism gives additional meaning to the concept by claiming, “Eurocentrism is not just another ethnocentrism. It is [...] the specific form of knowledge produced by modernity/colonialism.”¹² However, postcolonialism and decolonialism differ in the strategies they pursue to overcome Eurocentrism. Postcolonialism argues for a critical relativization, or, better—as “provincializing Europe [...] cannot be a project of cultural relativism”¹³—a critical contextualization of the European intellectual matrix. In contrast, decolonialism aims for a detachment from any European logic: a “delinking,” in the words of Argentine semiotician Walter D. Mignolo. According to him, social critique would need to disengage

from the Totality of Western epistemology, grounded in Latin and Greek and expanded around the globe by means of the six imperial and vernacular European languages of modernity. The geo- and bio-political shift in epistemology presupposes “border thinking” [...] and “border thinking” is the connector between the diversity of locals that were subjected as colonies of the modern empires (Spain, England, the US) or that as empires had to respond to Western expansion (e.g., China, Russia, the Ottoman Empire until 1922). Border thinking is grounded not in Greek thinkers but in the colonial wounds and imperial subordination and, as such, it should become the connector between the diversity

of subaltern histories (colonial and imperial – like Russia and the Ottoman empires) and corresponding subjectivities. [...] We are not, of course, looking to retrieve an authentic knowledge from Chinese, Arabic or Aymara; but, rather, we want to include the perspective and in the foundation of knowledge subjectivities that have been subjected in and by the colonial matrix of power.¹⁴

This “de-colonial epistemic shift”¹⁵ would lead to another epistemology, “other principles of knowledge and understanding and, consequently, other economy, other politics, other ethics.”¹⁶ Thus, “delinking means to change the terms and not just the content of the conversation.”¹⁷

Western epistemology would be “ego-logical,”¹⁸ i.e., the claim of an individual—for which René Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am” was paradigmatic—produced through conquest and the claim of comparative superiority over subjected populations.¹⁹ The *ego conquiro* precedes the *ego cogito*: the emergence of European humanism “had as its condition of possibility the practical experience of absolute freedom that the Iberian conquerors enjoyed. The New World is in fact the experimental scene where the Western subject was able to exercise a freedom that no tradition, no power came to limit.”²⁰

2) Overcoming Eurocentrism in Postcolonialism and Decolonialism

What does a postcolonial and decolonial take on European values look like in practice? Do the approaches conceive of these values as false Western universals that need to be rejected, if we want to get rid of either a Eurocentric diffusion model or the “coloniality of power?” Before diving into that discussion, I want to recall the distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive values, such as scientific truth or republican equality, as both approaches address these values without neatly distinguishing them. Often, cognitive and non-cognitive values are merged into concepts such as Enlightenment or modernity that are at the heart of post- and decolonial approaches.

Postcolonialism: Recall that postcolonial historiography aims for carving out entanglements in the birth of the modern world. It is through three methods that it overcomes the diffusion model of the “hyperreal Europe.”

First, it is a critical contextualization that may be illustrated by parallel processes of Enlightenment in Europe and China analyzed in global history. “The confrontation with Western knowledge,” German historian Sabine Dabringhaus argues, “was an important impetus for the Chinese Enlightenment, which, however, cannot be regarded solely as an import from the West.”²¹ Furthermore, Europe was not the only world region in which the legitimacy of

established authorities was contested by the end of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. British historian Christopher Bayly, in his book *The Birth of the Modern World 1780-1914*, notes that, at the time of the French Revolution, “movements to purge the power-holders and submit them to ancient and universal virtues had already emerged in several parts of Asia and Africa.”²² Postcolonial historiography then “moves beyond the obsession with the Enlightenment’s European origins.”²³ global history shows how Enlightenment became, through re-articulations and reinventions in different areas of the world, an ubiquitous, i.e. a truly universal reference.

Second, postcolonial historiography carves out processes of hybridization or vernacularization and hence the influence of the non-Western on the West. This approach focuses on the negotiation of forms of modern rationality that took place “between metropole and colony.”²⁴ Following this line of thought, the global history of science shows, “knowledge grounded in European cultures once transplanted, not only becomes hybrid—or, to switch from biological to linguistic metaphors, creole—but also affects research questions and institutional interests back in Europe.”²⁵

Third, global history carries out a materialist contextualization. The analysis of connections is a springboard to study their concrete conditions, as Sebastian Conrad claims for another Western rationalism that was “exported” to Asia:

When critical intellectuals in Vietnam, Japan, or China began to read Marx, this was, rather logically, seen as evidence of the transcultural circulation of ideas. Accordingly, traditional histories charted the translation process, studied the reception of Marxist ideas, and looked for the impact of Marx’s texts on reformist thinking in Asia. While these were important facets of the problem, the more important causal links, it turned out, lay elsewhere. In this case, connectedness proved to be itself the result of social changes that had created the conditions under which reading Marx in Vietnam began to make political sense.²⁶

Decolonialism: whereas postcolonialism argues for the necessity of transnational history to “provincialize Europe,” decolonialism aims to “delink” from the European coloniality of knowledge by exploring thought originating from the borders of Western modernity. The diffusion model of European rationality is challenged in at least three ways here.

First, decolonialism introduces another periodization of modernity. The latter does not emerge out of political, social and cultural processes commonly located in Western Europe, such as reformation, Enlightenment, revolution, rationalization, or individualization. According to decolonial approaches, modernity is not cultural but geopolitical. It is “a structure and form of power with its epicenter in Southern Europe.”²⁷ Modernity has its roots in the conquest of

America and the domination of Iberian powers over the Atlantic since the late fifteenth century. It is through this periodization that decolonialism breaks with an essentialist and a diffusionist model of modernity, according to which it is an intrinsic and autonomous Western phenomenon that once arisen moves from Europe to the non-European world.

Second, according to decolonialism, there is no such a thing as the placeless, universal thought that is often claimed for cognitive European values such as the virtues of Western scientific proceedings. The latter have a history and are located in particular settings, i.e. anchored geo-historically. Their worldwide spread constitutes a “process of universalization of Western particularism.”²⁸

Third, decolonialism advocates for an “ecology of knowledge.”²⁹ Different forms of knowledge and ways of living connect to each other in border spaces where, Walter Mignolo argues, a thinking emerges that can “imagine a future that is not the future that those in Washington, or London, or Paris, or Berlin would like the people of the world to have.”³⁰ This “border thinking” brings together different experiences with imperial modernity. It is

one of the methods that can help us moving to sustain a vision—a pluri-versal and not a uni-versal vision—and to implement a set of strategies to accomplish it. The future could no longer be owned by one way of life [...], cannot be dictated by one project of liberation and de-colonization, and cannot be a polycentric world within Western categories of thoughts. A world in which many worlds could co-exist can only be made by the shared work and common goals of those who inhabit, dwell in one of the many worlds co-existing in one world and where differences are not cast in terms of values of plus and minus degree of humanity.³¹

3) Is Delinking a More Radical Critique of Eurocentrism?

We have seen how post- and decolonialism conceive of Eurocentrism and how they intend to overcome it. Let me finally discuss the claims that decolonialism presents an “even more radical interpretation”³² of Eurocentrism than postcolonialism, and that delinking is more consistent than provincialization with the project of breaking with the powerful universalization of Western discourses. I therefore want to review two projects Walter Mignolo characterizes as “decolonizing projects arising from the critical consciousness of the *damnés* [the wretched] of their racialization and the ways they have been dispossessed of their humanity (mind and soul).”³³ The two authors I chose out of Mignolo’s list of “decolonizing projects” are the Trinidadian historian C.L.R. James and Martinique psychiatrist Frantz Fanon. Both seem particularly useful here, as the former engages with non-cognitive European values and the latter

with cognitive European values. But can their attempts to overcome Eurocentrism meaningfully be grasped as efforts to delink from Western thought?

James' famous object of study, the Haitian slave revolution of 1791, is concerned with liberty and equality. From a Eurocentric perspective, it has been argued that these prominent values of the French Revolution have only been articulated more universally in the Caribbean upheaval—an argument that ignores Haitian sources and remains trapped in a European master discourse according to which the West fundamentally designed these concepts. German political theorist Jeanette Ehrmann has shown that this is a highly problematic conceptualization of the Haitian upheaval. The Caribbean constitutions of 1801 and 1805 do not simply broaden the 1789 French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. They articulate “divergent ideas of justice.”³⁴ Their criticism of liberal rights is anchored in “a thick description of enslaving Europe’s proclaimed universalism and associated experiences of injustice”³⁵ that does not reject universalism. A first critique of the subject of liberal rights is included in the constitution of 1801. It declares every person born in Haiti as French and establishes equality for all its inhabitants “whatever their color.”³⁶ This subversion of colonial racism that linked rights to skin color was answered by France with Napoleon’s order to kill all Black inhabitants of Saint-Domingue. Against the background of this experience, the revolutionary struggle shifted from a colorblind to a more substantial conception of equality. The constitution of 1805 declares Haiti a free, independent, and sovereign state,³⁷ in which “slavery is forever abolished.”³⁸ Even though the preamble states that “all mankind are equal,”³⁹ article twelve refuses all “whiteman” any kind of property rights. Here the articulation of citizenship, whiteness, masculinity and property that characterizes European values of liberty and equality is disintegrated. The following articles show this is no reverse racism—naturalized White women as well as naturalized Germans and Polish supporters of the Haitian revolution are exempt from the property ban. The idea of equality shifts from possessive individualism to non-hierarchical relationships.⁴⁰ Moreover, a particular political subject is constituted through the upheaval: Haitians are from now on “known only by the generic appellation of Blacks.”⁴¹ When C.L.R. James designates the Haitian revolutionaries “Black Jacobins,”⁴² he points to the fact that radical egalitarianism takes a completely different form when articulated outside of Europe. “With the revolutionary category of blackness,” Ehrmann argues, “the Haitians create a new concept of universal humanity. This concept is based on lived experiences of injustice and it makes an explicit confrontation with differentiations and hierarchizations of people the precondition for a society of the free and equal.”⁴³

Whereas James’ discussion is concerned with non-cognitive values, Fanon’s writings raise the question of what cognitive European values become when appropriated in the Global South. French philosopher Matthieu Renault has analyzed in detail the “epistemic displacement”

at work in Fanon's writings. He highlights five methods. *First*, there is an "appropriation and deepening of the European self-critical tradition."⁴⁴ Fanon mobilizes authors like Nietzsche, Marx and Freud. He never draws on "arguments that claim to be non- or anti-European, but rather makes use of Europe's internal conflicts and divisions."⁴⁵ However, when the Caribbean author uses this critical tradition, he does not simply repeat it, but translates it from an anticolonial perspective. *Second*, Fanon adopts the point of view of the oppressed, particularly when analyzing the psychic effects of colonialism on its victims. *Third*, the author of *The Wretched of the Earth* resituates theoretical discourses geopolitically. "By 'localizing' and reinterpreting European theories in a colonial context," Renault argues, "Fanon challenges their claim to be true at all times and in all places, regardless of the singularity of their conditions of production and places of enunciation."⁴⁶ *Fourth*, Fanon subverts the order of Western discourse by disordering and reordering theories and empirical analysis. *Fifth*, the Caribbean author practices a "theoretical reversion."⁴⁷ Hence the idea of a conflict opposing two "different species"⁴⁸—an idea that is no "racial war" in the colonizers' sense but a displacement in response to the denial of class struggle in the colonies.

Are James' and Fanon's projects better conceived as decolonial "border thinking" that is more radical than any postcolonial critique? I think neither that decolonialism captures well what James and Fanon are actually doing, nor that "delinking" is an adequate proposition for overcoming Eurocentrism in values. When decolonialism declares European forms of freedom, knowledge, etc. to be inextricably linked to the "coloniality of power," i.e. to the original experience of colonial subjugation of America, it draws a unilateral historical genealogy. Furthermore, it underestimates both the reflexivity and the justificatory requirements of European values and thought.⁴⁹ It seems to me that James and the Haitian revolution, in their overcoming of a Eurocentric form of liberty and equality, follow more closely the methodology of global history—critical contextualization and hybridization against the background of a changing social environment—than a decolonial method with its view of a colonially infected modernity and the idea of a completely different way of thinking that enters into contact with the empire at border zones.⁵⁰ Fanon too does not delink from European thought. He does quite the opposite, as we have seen above: his appropriation and mobilization in a different context displaces, resituates, rearticulates and subverts Western ideas.

Conclusion

While decolonialism's claim for radicalism might result from political and academic constellations, theoretically it is unsubstantiated. Where confronted with criticism of relativism or romanticism, decolonial authors defend their approach in a way that makes it hard to

distinguish it from postcolonialism. This raises serious paradoxes. Take for instance the claim that “border thinking”

does not seek to replace one centrality with another in a logic of frontal opposition to European thought, but rather to avoid the trap of Eurocentrism by subtly introducing the memory and perspective of the colonized—the “colonial difference”—into the very heart of the European intellectual heritage.⁵¹

Here, European intellectual heritage suddenly is valued as part of a discussion where it was initially seen as inextricably linked to colonial modernity that extinguishes, by its own logic, the thinking of the colonized other.

If delinking then is no viable alternative to a Eurocentric conception of values, how can we conceive of the overcoming of their historical form, one that is linked to a history of oppression and subjection? We should remember that the entanglement postcolonial historiography insists on must be translated politically into the project of an “interactive universalism that arises from dialogue and encounter with the other.”⁵² This dialog is characterized by “ideals of equality and mutual respect”⁵³ and an overcoming of one’s subjective conditions of thinking that systematically considers the other. The provincializing of one’s thought cannot be limited to the anticipation of the communication with the other. “Rather,” as Seyla Benhabib observes, “taking into account the perspectives of others must involve a genuine encounter with them as interlocutors, not only in the context of dialogue, but also through projects of world-making and world-sharing through common engagement in practices and institutions.”⁵⁴ This postcolonization of European values is precisely what Fanon was considering essential when applying Marxism to the colonial issue: a process of stretching.⁵⁵

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Notes

¹ See Anderson, "Uses of Value Judgments."

² However, non-cognitive values might also play a role in scientific investigations: "in selecting the phenomena to be investigated and suggesting hypotheses to be tested", in justifying "the imposition of practical or informational constraints on scientific procedures" and "in determining what level of certainty in a scientific theory is demanded before it is accepted as a guide for action." (Ibid., 7–8) Anderson shows that non-cognitive values also guide research that conceive of itself as neutral, i.e. value-free in Max Weber's sense, and that their perceptibility

depends on hegemony. She convincingly argues *pace* Weber that non-cognitive value judgments can be epistemically fruitful if they help to broaden the scope of evidence that supports scientific claims.

³ Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, 40.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Conrad, *What Is Global History?* 54.

⁶ Hall, “When was ‘the post-colonial’?” 255.

⁷ Mignolo, “Further Thoughts on (De)Coloniality,” 21.

⁸ Quijano, “Coloniality of Power,” 533.

⁹ Quijano, “Coloniality and Modernity/Rationality,” 173.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ The classification of these suppressions differs in the two approaches: whereas Chakrabarty speaks of ‘Minority Histories, Subaltern Pasts’ (Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, 97-113), the Portuguese sociologist Boaventura de Sousa Santos focusses on ‘epistemicide’ (Santos, *Epistemologies of the South*), i.e. not marginalization, but the actual extinction of non-Western forms of knowledge.

¹² Colin/Quiroz, *Pensées décoloniales*, 157.

¹³ Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, 43. Chakrabarty argues that the project of provincializing Europe cannot aim for stripping away with cognitive European values: it ‘cannot originate from the stance that the reason/science/universals that help define Europe as the modern are simply “culture-specific” and therefore only belong to the European cultures. For the point is not that Enlightenment rationalism is always

unreasonable in itself, but rather a matter of documenting how—through what historical process—its “reason,” which was not always self-evident to everyone, has been made to look obvious far beyond the ground where it originated’ (ibid.).

¹⁴ Mignolo, “Delinking,” 493.

¹⁵ Ibid., 453.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid., 459.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ See Dussel, “Anti-Cartesian Meditations.”

²⁰ Colin/Quiroz, *Pensées décoloniales*, 134.

²¹ Dabringhaus, “Aufklärung und Wissenschaft in China,” 263.

²² Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World*, 103.

²³ Conrad, “Enlightenment in Global History,” 999.

²⁴ Stoler/Coper, “Between Metropole and Colony.”

²⁵ Tilley, “Global Histories, Vernacular Science, and African Genealogies,” 113-114.

²⁶ Conrad, *What Is Global History?* 70.

²⁷ Colin/Quiroz, *Pensées décoloniales*, 131.

²⁸ Ibid., 163.

²⁹ Santos, *Epistemologies of the South*, 188-211.

³⁰ Mignolo, “Delinking,” 497-498.

³¹ Ibid., 499.

³² Colin/Quiroz, *Pensées décoloniales*, 157.

³³ Mignolo, “Delinking,” 499.

³⁴ Ehrmann, “Konstitution der Rassismuskritik,” 33.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Haiti, “Constitution of 1801,” art. 4.

³⁷ See Haiti, “Second Constitution of Haiti,” art. 1.

³⁸ Ibid., art. 2.

³⁹ Ibid., preamble.

⁴⁰ See Anderson, “What Is the Point of Equality?” It is interesting that the North American philosopher Elizabeth Anderson does not rely on non-European examples or sources to develop here model of relational egalitarianism. However, it should at least be noted that unequal race

relations are at the heart of her conception, even more explicitly when she develops relational equality out of abolitionist efforts in the US (Anderson, *The Imperative of Integration*, 89-95).

⁴¹ Haiti, “Second Constitution of Haiti,” 14.

⁴² James, *The Black Jacobins*.

⁴³ Ehrmann, “Konstitution der Rassismuskritik,” 37. German philosopher Rahel Jaeggi has developed a theorization of the different concepts of moral progress at play here. The Eurocentric vision is that of an expansion of the normative circle. The morally relevant group is broadened, and epistemic failures are corrected. Hence, moral progress is no actual innovation, no break with the existing. Certainly, this model grasps something of what happened in Haiti, i.e. the idea of normative inclusion and that social movements mobilized to achieve it (the slaves were welcoming the French that went to Saint Domingue to suppress their rebellion by singing the *La Marseillaise*). At the same time this model considers the inclusion of formerly excluded as a paternalistic act that ignores their agency and the fundamentally conflicting character of any circle expansion. Moral progress is hardly understandable that way: the Haitian revolution does not only expand the circle. It changes it qualitatively (see Jaeggi, *Fortschritt und Regression*, 70-76).

⁴⁴ Renault, “Frantz Fanon et la décolonisation des savoirs,” 5.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 6.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 9.

⁴⁸ Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 5.

⁴⁹ This critique draws from both Seyla Benhabib’s critique of Mignolo’s discussion of Kant (see Benhabib, “Für einen interaktiven Universalismus”) and Miranda Fricker’s critique of postmodernist critical epistemologies (see Fricker, “Feminism in epistemology”). For further discussion, also see Alcoff, “Philosophy, the Conquest, and the Meaning of Modernity.”

⁵⁰ I would argue that this is also the way Marx overcomes his early Eurocentrism (see Lindner, “Marx’s Eurocentrism” and Lindner, “Postkolonialer oder dekolonialer Marxismus?”).

⁵¹ Colin/Quiroz, *Pensées décoloniales*, 185.

⁵² Benhabib, “Für einen interaktiven Universalismus,” 62.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 63.

⁵⁵ Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 5.